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ABSTRACT
Assessing the economic impacts of alternative Information System (IS) designs and selecting IS design
parameter values for a given decision setting are two important research issues in the domain of
Information Systems. Evaluation studies based on information economics provide rigorous but
restricted models, while traditional MIS studies suggest richer but less formal evaluation frameworks. '
In this paper, we attempt to combine the analytical rigor and descriptive richness into a unified and
consistent basis for evaluating IS designs and making design modifications (improvements) to existing
IS. Expanding on the concepts of information economics, a multi-dimensional mathematical model of
information quality is developed. Several properties of the quality model with implications for system
design are derived in the form of propositions. The impacts of information quality differential upon the
effectiveness of an operational level decision setting are investigated through a decision-theoretic
approach. Next, a hierarchical model is suggested for relating system design variables to the quality of
information generated by the IS. Based on the quality differential impact analysis and the hierarchical
model, a structured methodology for making design changes to existing IS is outlined.
1. INTRODUCTION the quantitative models and the realistic features of the
MIS approach. Expanding on the concept of"information
Two distinct but related issues in the domain of Informa- structures," we develop a mathematical model of informa-
tion Systems (IS) are system design and evaluation. What tion quality. The economic impacts of the information
are the criteria on which alternative IS designs should be quality differential on the decisions utilizing the informa-
evaluated? How should the design parameters of an IS be tion are determined. Some properties of the informationdetermined for a given context of use? These have quality model with implications for the system designer are
remained two key research questions in the field for many derived. For example, we show how less detailedl informa-
years. A review of the relevant literature reveals two tion (which is cheaper to obtain) can lead to the same
categories of research, based on information economics payoff for a class of decision problems. Counter-intuitive
(Feltham 1968; Hilton 1981; Marschak 1963, 1971; Mar- results, such as reduced payoffs with increased reporting
schak and Radner 1972; Merkhofer 1977) and traditional frequency, and the conditions under which such problems
MIS approaches such as the user satisfaction method are circumvented are obtained. We also provide an
(Bailey and Pearson 1983; Epstein and King 1982; Nolan exposition of the design tradeoffs in the choice of informa-
and Seward 1974; Zmud 1978). Information economics tion attribute values. Building on the impacts analysis, weprovides a rigorous methodology for evaluating "informa- propose a structured methodology for making design
tion structures" in terms of a single criterion called improvements to existing systems. As a typical example
'fineness" (Marschak and Radner 1972). The MIS litera- of an operational level decision setting, we use a produc-
ture, although not mathematically as precise as information tion scheduling scenario as the reference context.
economics, suggests numerous information attributes or
criteria that are not considered by the information econo- 2. MOTIVATION AND PRIOR RESEARCH
mics models. Clearly, there exists a gap between the rigor
of information economics models and the richness of the Many IS evaluation techniques employ user satisfaction asMIS studies. a surrogate measure of system effectiveness (Bailey and
Pearson 1983; Ives, Olson and Baroudi 1983; Nolan and
In this paper, we attempt to develop a unified and theoreti- Seward 1974; Powers and Dickson 1973). While this
cally sound basis for the evaluation and design of IS used approach measures the users' satisfaction with an IS,
in operational level decision making. One of the goals of assessing the economic impacts of the lS is beyond the
this research is to preserve both the analytical precision of scope of this method (Chismar, Kriebel and Melone 1985).
327
In information economics, there has been rigorous research for this separation of the IS and decision characteristics is
on the "value of information" using an information attribute shown in Figure 1.
called "fineness" (Marschak and Radner 1972). The
"fineness" criterion provides a formal mechanism for
comparing "information structures." An "information IS Desip Su,Y,Im
structure" is an abstraction of an IS and may be charac- V//bks -* Cl lli/#Ik' --0
terized by a single "likelihood function." However, as
indicated by MIS studies (Adams 1975; Davis 1974; Emery  
1971; Epstein and King 1982; Powers and Dickson 1973;
ECUK»M: Ex'i,sk
ImpCS -IC> A.#,I.
Zmud 1978), an IS requires a multidimensional description,
a feature not considered by the information economics
models. I**0.'Ir=:'ics
Thus, it is evident that in spite of the existence of a body
of literature, there is no generalized analytical model of Figure 1. A Conceptual Model for IS Design Analysis:
information quality and value. As emphasized by Kriebel Separation of Signal, System, and
Decision Characteristics(1979), a consistent mathematical model of information
quality is the first step in the evaluation of an IS. The crux
of the evaluation problem lies in being able to measure the
impact of information quality differential upon the payoff The signals generated by an IS have a set of attributes,
to the decision maker (DM) utilizing the information. In
which can be defined to be independent of any decision
this paper, one of our goals is to reduce the large informa- context, and may therefore be called int,insic attributes.
tion attribute set found in the literature into a parsi- The design variables are linked to the intrinsic attributes
moniousbut sufficient set of analytically precise definitions. via an intermediate level of variables, the subsystem
characteristics. In Section 7, the IS is represented as aThis precision eliminates redundant attributes, helps derive collection of subsystems. Each subsystem has certainpropositions with system design implications, and provides characteristics such as sampling and information updatinga method for calculating the dollar impacts of information time, processing accuracy, etc. (henceforth referred to asquality on the DM's decisions. Moreover, the proposed subsystem characteristics), which are determined by theanalysis can be used to make design improvements to design variables for that subsystem. The intuitive justifica-
existing systems. tion for this three-level hierarchy consisting of design
In Section 3, we present a conceptual model for the variables, subsystem characteristics, and signal attributes is
separation of system and decision characteristics. We as follows. Typically, there are a large number of design
define a sufficient but parsimonious set of signal attributes variables for an IS. Dealing with these design variables
in Section 4 and outline a decision-theoretic method for directly makes design modification a difficult task. The
evaluating the impacts of information quality upon the intermediate level (subsystem characteristics) enables the
DM's payoffs in Section 5. We discuss "subsystem charac- designer to perform "dominance analysis" and thereby
teristics," design parameters and their general functional identify a small number of "dominant" design variables.
relationships to signal attributes in Section 6. In Section Together with the characteristics of the decision context,
the signal attributes determine the DM's payoff (or cost).7, we provide a structured framework for choosing and
Marschak and Radner (1972) analyzed the impacts ofsetting values of design parameters through "dominance
analysis." "fineness" of information structures on a DM's payoff. In
this paper, the analysis is extended to incorporate multiple
dimensions of information quality and their impacts on the
3. SEPARATION OF SIGNAL, SYSTEM AND DM's expected payoff.
DECISION CHARACTERISTICS
£1*insic attributes are payoff-relevant (P-R) descriptions
Evaluation of IS design involves consideration of two of intrinsic attributes: They indicate whether differences
components: the lS itself and the DM's environment. The
in signal attributes are relevant for a given decision setting.
IS designer determines the setting of design variables such For example, two systems may differ in terms of their
as the number of information processors, storage capacity accuracy and still yield the same payoff under certain
and number of error detection mechanisms. The choice conditions. Extrinsic attributes are thus measured by theimpact of signal attribute differentials upon a particularof these variables, in turn, determines the attributes of decision context. Intrinsic attributes are stated in techno-information (signals) generated by the IS. The impacts of
these attributes on the DM's effectiveness depend on the logical terms such as time, frequency, and probability of
characteristics of the decision setting. In order that the
error, while extrinsic attributes are stated in units of payoff
same set of definitions may be applied to any context, the C e.g., dollars). The designer of the system deals with
definitions of design variables and signal attributes must be intrinsic attributes, while the economic impacts (extrinsic
independent of the decision setting. A conceptual model attributes) are of interest to the DM.
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4. INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES The attributes, 'reporting delay," "age of information," and
"currency of information," can be derived from monitoring
In this section, we build on the MIS evaluation literature time. "Reporting delay" and "age of information" for any
and define a mathematically consistent set of intrinsic uncertainty source can be found by subtracting the corres-
signal attributes. While we do not claim this set to ponding monitoring time element from signal timing and
constitute an exhaustive list, we show that it captures the current time respectively. "Currency of information" is
essence of a large number of attributes found in the decision context dependent and can be defined as the time
literature. We propose the following attribute set. at which the decision is taken minus the monitoring time.
1. Signal timing
2. Reporting frequency 43 Signal Resolution
3. Monitoring time (period)
4. Signal resolution Definition 3: Let Sl and S2 be the sets of distinct states for
5. Intrinsic accuracy IS 1 and 2 respectively. IS 1 is said to have a higher signal
6. Intrinsic informativeness resolution compared to IS 2, if the following condition is
satisfied:
These attributes are generally not independent of each
other. This non-orthogonality gives rise to interesting For all si €St 3si€S2 such that st C 62 (11)
tradeoffs between the attributes, an issue discussed in
Section 7 on design choices. Intuitively, the condition implies that system 1 reports
greater details either or both in terms of the number of
Before defining the attributes, it is important to provide a uncertainty sources and the value ranges. For example, the
black-box description of an IS. An IS reports on several IS2 database may contain information on demand and lead
sources of uncertainty (e.g., demand, inventory, lead times, time, a subset of the information content of the ISl
raw material prices). A state of the world may be defined database (demand, lead time and prices), and therefore
as a vector of random variables associated with uncertainty have lower resolution. As a second example, system 1 may
sources and is described by a set of signals, {y}, from the recognize every integer value of demand, while system 2
IS. For every IS there is a set of states, {s} = S, that are may be sensitive only to low, medium and high ranges of
recognized by the IS as being distinct. For example, one demand. Resolution also covers aggregation of informa-
IS may report the exact lead time, while another may only tion (such as monthly versus weekly data, or total demand
recognize short and long lead time ranges. Generally, the versus demand for individual items).
signals are not perfect, being contaminated with "noise."
This noise is expressed in the form of a likelihood function3 Resolution does not consider the "noise" present in the
A(yls),the probability of receiving ycY, given that s€S has information. For example, the system that reports demand
occurred (see Marschak and Radner 1972). for individual items is considered to have higher resolution
than the one reporting total demand, even though the
latter may have less "noise" due to a natural averaging
4.1 Signal Timing and Reporting Frequency effect. For systems that are noiseless with respect to their
state partitions, resolution and "fineness" (as used by
Definition 1: Timing of a signal is the time at which the Marschak and Radner) have the same meaning:
signal is received by a DM. The reporting frequency, f, is
the inverse of the time interval between the receipt of two
successive signals by a DM. 4.4 Intrinsic Accuracy
While it may seem natural to associate reporting frequency Definition 4: For two systems differing only in terms of
with repetitive decision making, in Section 6, we show how their likelihood functions, one is called intrinsically more
reporting frequency can be important for a single.decision accurate than the other only if it is Blackwell sufficient for
setting. the other (Blackwell 1953; Hilton 1981). Let system i have
a likelihood function A(yi Is), i = 1,2. {s} = S is the set of
distinct states for the two IS, and {Yi} = Yi is the signal set
of system i. Since S and Y can be continuous or discrete
4.2 Monitoring Time (Period) sets, we use the integral sign to denote a generalized
summation operator. Of course, any coarsening of S or Y
Definition 2: Let an IS monitor the states of uncertainty is discrete. System 1 is intrinsically more accurate or
sources 1, N at times tltN respectively. The set of these Blackwell sufficient for system 2 if a stochastic transforma-
times is called the monitoring time of the IS. If the tion g(yi,yi) exists for which the following are satisfied:
monitoring of an uncertainty source, i, takes place from ti
to ti'' then the interval [ti, ti'l is used to denote the moni-
A(Yuls) = f g(yl,yDA(yl Is) Vs£ S VY2fY2 (2)toring period for i. yl€Yi
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g<Yl,Yj = 1 Vyi€Yi (3) with respect to {s}.
If A(wiil 81) 00 for j 01, then intm·parlition noise exists
Y2£Y2
g(yi,yj < 00 VY2€Y2 (4) more informative than a noiseless system (with lower
Proposition 1: A noisy system with higher resolution is
Yl EY: resolution) if the noise is only intra-partition type.
More intuitively, one system is more accurate than the Proof: Let {y} be the signal set corresponding to {s} in
other if the latter can be realized from the former through the above definition. Using Definition 5, it is seen that a
a stochastic transformation. The resolutions of the two stochastic transformation from {8} to {s}, given by
systems must be the same for a comparison of intrinsic g(v/k'yi) = 1 for i=k, and 0 otherwise, satisfies conditions
accuracy. For example, it is meaningless to compare the 2,3 and 4.
accuracies of the blind men, each of whom is describing a
different part of the elephant. Discussion: This proposition shows that resolution can be
the sole determinant of informativeness when the noise can
be separated into disjoint components corresponding to the
4.5 Intrinsic Informativeness partition elements 4, i = 1,2,..,n. It provides a simple tool
for comparing the informativeness of a subset of IS without
The definition of intrinsic informativeness is the same as doing the complex sufficiency calculations.
that of intrinsic accuracy with the restriction on resolution
removed. Note that uncertainty about the true states of
the world is introduced by differences in accuracy and 4.7 Mapping between the Proposed and Existing
resolution. Thus informativeness is the net effect of these Attribute Sets
differences. The importance of informativeness is that it
allows us to compare a set of IS (with comparable resolu- Having defined the signal attributes, we provide a mapping
tions) without reference to a decision context. Thus if ISl between these attributes and those mentioned in the
is more informative than IS2, then this relationship holds literature. This comparison highlights the confusion that
true for any setting. Therefore, conditions under which exists m a section of the evaluation literature due to mixing
one system is more informative than another are of special of intrinsic and extrinsic attributes and decision characteris-
interest to us. ' tics. It is not possible to show a mathematical correspon-
dence between the proposed attributes and those found in
Higher resolution does not guarantee higher informative- the literature because many of the latter ones have not
ness. The noise present in the signals may affect informa- been defined precisely.
tiveness significantly. Similarly, low noise alone cannot
ensure high informativeness, since resolution (level of From the table, we note that several attributes such as
detail) is the second determinant of informativeness. The timeliness, relevance, and redundancy, which have been
set of special cases where resolution is sufficient for classified as information attributes, are actually decision
informativeness is discussed below. context dependent (extrinsic attributes). While intrinsic
attributes can be compared for two lS without reference
to a decision context, it is not meaningful to use extrinsic
4.6 Intra-Partition and Inter-Partition Noise attributes as dimensions of information quality.
Let {s} and {0} be partitions of a state space S and let -
{ 8  have higher resolution than {s}. Let si =
C e i,e'j, -.,em,} for all i as shown in Figure 2. Let {wii} be 5. EXTRINSIC AITRIBUTES: IMPACTS OF
the signal set corresponding to { Gii}· SIGNAL ATYRIBUTES
Two systems may differ in terms of their signal attributes;
however, the difference in payoff to the DM due to this
1 44 1 4 1 L.1 1 attribute differential depends on the decision characteris-
le: 1 1.1
ties. Thus, two systems with different signal timings may
8, yield the same payoff in certain situations. In that case,
the two systems have the same "timeliness" (to be des-
cribed as an extrinsic attribute), though the signal attri-
Figure 1 State Space Partitions with Comparable Resolution butes are different. This phenomenon is central to the
notion of payoff-relevance in that intrinsic attribute
differences may or may not cause a difference in the DM's
Definition 5: If 1(Wk| Blb = 0 for i 0 k and any 1 and j, payoff. When they do not, the attribute differences are not
then there is no mter-parna-on noise with respect to {s}. relevant to the context.
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CURRENT LITERATURE PROPOSED ATTRIBUTE COMMENTS
Frequency (Davis)
Repetitiveness (Adams) Reporting frequency
Frequency of use (Gorry and Scott-Morton) - Decision characteristic
(Gorry and Scott-Morton)
Response time (Emery) Signal timing
Timeliness (Fellham; Hilton) Extrinsic attribute Context dependent
Reporting delay Signal timing -
(Epstein and King) Monitoring time
Currency Decision time - Context dependent
(Gorry and Scott-Morton) Monitoring time
Age (Adams) Current time -
Monitoring time
Time horizon (Gorry and Scott-Morton) Monitoring time Time covered by the report, e.g., daily demand for a week.
Reporting cycle (Epstein and King)
Scope (Gorry and Scott-Morton) Resolution Number of uncertainty sources included; aggregation; range of
Content (Adams; Emery) values.
Fineness (Marschak and Radner) Resolution IS is noiseless for the set of distinct states.
Aggregation (Gorry and Scott-Morton),
Summarization (Adams) Resolution
Relevance (Adams), Extrinsic attribute Context dependent





Flexibility (Emery; Merkhofer) Decision characteristic
Cost (Davis; Powers and Dickson)
Value (Davis) Not a signal attribute
We show that differences in payoff occur due to a reduc- the MRP-based IS is rarely perfect, the correct amount to
tion of the DM's action set and/or uncertainty differences be produced is not known with certainty. Then an out-
regarding the true states of the world. The individual and come may be defined in terms of shortage or excess,
joint impacts of intrinsic attributes upon the DM's payoffs depending on the state and the action chosen. We use a
are illustrated below using a production scheduling decision simple cost function defined as z(a,s) = c+w+ + c-w;
context. The relevant uncertainty sources for this setting where w+ and w refer to the amount of excess and
are demand, inventory, and shop floor condition (e.g., shortage, and c+ and c- to the corresponding unit cost. In
machine loading and operator capacity), one or more of the following subsections, we use the terms "expected
which may be important for a given setting. For simplicity, payoff' and "expected cost" interchangeably, with the
we only consider demand uncertainty in this paper. understanding that payoff in the current context is the
Information on these uncertainty sources is generally negative of the expected cost.
provided by an integrated Material Requirements Planning
(MRP) based IS, which contains order processing/fore- 5.1 Payoff Relevant Timing
casting, inventory tracking and scheduling subsystems as
components. The information received from the system IS signals often get delayed due to various reasons. For
may be inaccurate, dated, too aggregate, delayed or example, long batching delays in a batch-oriented system
irrelevant. We attempt to estimate the dollar impacts of are inevitable. In this section, we assess the impact of this
these information attributes. delay on the DM's cost.
Let a be the amount to be produced, an action chosen by Definition 6: Let the timings of two otherwise identical
the DM. Let {s} denote the set of demand states. Since systems be tl and t2· If the DM's action set gets reduced
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in the interval [ti,td, such that an action clement which is
optimal for some signal is lost, then the system with timing A(t) = i, 30-3t if t < 10
4 is considered more timely. The value of timeliness is the 0 if t > 10
difference in the DM's expected payoff. Thus, if the action
set remains stationary in [tt,td, then the value of timeliness
is zero. Let the DM's cost function be z = 10(a-s)2 and the
demand information system likelihood matrix be X(yi I si),An important subset of decision problems involves the ACY21 st), A(yi I sD, A(y,I sj = .6, .4, .4, .6 respectively.choice of numerical variables (e.g., the amount to produce
or order in case of production or order schedules). In Before t = 4, A(t) does not become binding on the optimalmany situations, the maximum value of the variable that amounts to produce, and the total minimum cost is $240.
can be chosen decreases with time. For example, with a Thus earlier signal timing has no impact before t = 4. But
given deadline, the maximum amount that can be produced for t=5 and 6, the expected cost increases to $245 and
reduces with time. Similarly, for raw materials purchase, $340 respectively. In fact, it is not worth having the systema vendor may fill in orders on a FCFS basis. In that case.' (even if for free) with signal timing t > 6, since the DM'sorders placed later have a lower chance of getting filled in expected cost with a null system is $250.a given period. Let A(t) denote the maximum value of the
decision variable that can be chosen at t. Also, let p(s) be
the prior probability of s. 5.2 Payoff Relevant Accuracy
Proposition 2: With a stationary likelihood function.' Definition 7: For two systems differing only in terms ofearlier signal timing is preferred if their intrinsic accuracies, the value of payoff relevant (P-R)
accuracy is the difference in expected payoffs (or costs)BA- < 0. given by expression (5) above, with Ak representing theat likelihood function of system k, k = 1,2 and with tl = t2-
Proof: The difference in expected costs due to signal From the definition of intrinsic accuracy, it can be noted
timings ti and ti can be shown to be that the payoff associated with a more accurate system is
at least as high as that from a less accurate system.(5)
5.3 Payoff Relevant Reporting Frequency
E (-1)k+1  min
k=1 yfY aE[OACED] · sfsz(a,s), (sly)p(y) Reporting frequency, f, depends on the type of system in
use. An on-line system displays information immediately,
while a batch system reports only periodically. A deferred
where A(sly) = A(yls)p(s) / p(y) and the marginal on-line system has a reporting frequency in between those
probability of on-line and batch systems. For a single decision in a
given time frame [O,T] reporting frequency impacts become
A (y Is)p(s) and timing effects.
subtle and can be thought of as a combination of accuracy
S€S
Say a production decision has to be taken by T. If 1/f <
Since A(ti) > A(t2) for t2 > ti, if a > A(tb for any signal T, then the DM receives more than one signal (describing
y, then expression (5) is less than zero, showing that the the state of the same uncertainty sources, though with
expected cost is lower for system 1. increasing accuracy) in [O,T], assuming that the first signal
is received at t = 0. When accuracy increases with time
Discussion: This proposition provides a way to measure (due to a reduction in uncertainty over time), the nIh signal
the usefulness of a system on the basis of its signal timing. is always more accurate than the n-lth signal for n =
The proposition implicitly indicates the possibility of a 1,2,..,n. However, if the maximum amount that can be
noiseless system becoming inferior to a null system because produced, A(t), decreases over time, then the DM has to
of the former's signal timing. A numerical example determine the optimal trade offbetween"good" actions and
involving demand uncertainty follows. more accurate information. In particular, after receiving
a signal, the DM has to choose whether it is optimal to
Example: Let there be two demand states st = 10 and take an action immediately (denoted b a) or to wait for
s2 = 20 with prior probabilities Pl = P2 = .5. Let the the next signal (denoted by B). If the P signal received at
maximum amount that can be produced be time variant time (i-1)/f is y, let it be denoted by Yi· The DM's
and be given by expected cost with a reporting frequency f is given by:
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f min Cip(y) where f 1 (6) Example: Let two otherwise identical demand forecasting
6 6 [ot,B] IS 1 and 2 report demand at intervals of 3 and 4 weeks
Yl€Y respectively. If the signal accuracy increases with time, the
likelihood matrix of each IS gradually approaches an
identity matrix. For illustration, let the time variation be
min given by At(yl I st) = At(Y21 SD = 1 -.4e-": Let A(t) be given
= a€[OA(0)1  SES z(a,s),(slyi) if 6 =01 by 36-t2 if t < 6, and 0 otherwise. Let the cost function
be z = 10(a-sjz.
- f min
Ca|p(Y2 | Yl) if 6 =B With system 1, the DM is forced to take an action at t = 3,
6 E [c,Bl because the next signal is at t=6 with A(6) = 0. With
Y2€Y system 2 (which has lower reporting frequency), the DM
takes an action after receiving the second signal at t = 4,
42 may similarly be defined terms of (3• and this results in the lowest expected cost.
Proposition 3: For two otherwise identical systems 1 and
2 with reporting frequencies f, and fz respectively, fi > G 5.4 Payoff Relevant Monitoring Time
does not guarantee lower expected cost with system 1.
Very often a DM may need to know the value of a random
Proof: By construction. Say fi and G are such that three variable (e.g., demand) at a particular time in order to
signals (at t= 0, 1/fi, and 2/fi) from system 1 and two make a decision. For example, a DM using a simple
signals (at t -0, 1/fj from system 2 are received by the forecasting routine needs to know the demand, inventory
DM in the interval [O,T]. Since the accuracy increases with and shop floor conditions fur day t in order to make a
time, signal 2 (from system 11) <a signal 2 (from system 2) production decision for day t + 1. In this case, t is the P-R
<, signal 3 (from system 1), where <, stands for "less monitoring time. If the IS monitors the value of the
accurate than." Let Yi· denote the ith signal from system i, random variables at any other point in time, then the
i = 1,2. The first signaJ is denoted by yi for both systems. corresponding signal becomes less valuable, even though
Say A(t) and the likelihood function are such that for all it may be perfect for the state of the world at the sampling
Yi, 6 =B, and that instant. In general, the larger the difference between the
P-R and actual monitoring times, the less the P-R rele-
vance of the signal. In fact, when the difference is suffi-
ciently high, the signal has no releyance to the state of them in
722£YaE[OA(1/fjl  sfs z(a,s)A(sly )p(y lyl) <
world at the required time. Let s denote state s at time
22 22 t. If the monitoring time is 0 and the P-R time is t, then
the expected cost is given by
(7)
f min
y12£ yac [OA(1/ft)] · sfs z(a,S)A(s 1 2)PC 2|Yl) <
fy,yac[O,Al Jsoes s,ES Z(a,s )p(s 199 A(sgy)p(y)
min r r
f min
y13fya€[O,AG/fi)1  sfs z(a,s)A(s | )P( 3 lyl)
where p(st I soj) is the probability of state si occurring at t,
given that state sj occurred at 0.
The above condition implies that for all signals at 0, the
DM waits for a later signal, and that the expected cost of
taking an action at t = 1/4 is lower than those of taking Proposition 4: Let the functional form for the conditional
actions at either 1/4 or 2/fi. probability p(s i I s°j) be given by
Discussion: This proposition shows that an increase in
reporting frequency can lead to an increase in expected = e" + (1 - em) p(sti) if i=j
cost if the action set is time variant. The design implica-
tion that emerges as a corollary is that the reporting = p(si,)[1 - e*,] otherwise.
frequency should always be increased by an integer
multiple of the original frequency. Otherwise, arbitrary
increases in frequency (as used in the proof above) can For sufficiently large L the system approaches a null
system. The rate of approach increases with a.lead to higher costs. A numerical example follows.
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Proof: Let p(s') be the DM's prior probability density on The expected cost is given by
{s} at t. Then as t -+ CO, p(sti I S j) -+ p(s i)
Therefore, VaV € > 0 3t such that I p(s'i) - p(sti 1 soj) 1 <
 v i and j. Thus, for sufficiently small c, Le., for suffi-
f rnYn f
ciently large t, expression (7) tends to yey a€[OA] Js ES z(a,sp)A(sply)p(y)
min
fy,ya,[0.Als'£Sfs'¢ S z(a,s.5p(4ACS'ly)p(y)
Example: A numerical example involving aggregation of
I l l information may be useful. Consider the demand for two
min f t t items 1 and 2 denoted by random variables xi and Xe
J z(a,s )p(s ) respectively. Let xi, X2 £ { 100,200}. Let the cost functionac[O,A] s'€S be given by z(at,22791,© = 4(a -X ) + 6(82-XD: Thus, there
are four P-R states. LEt an (xi,© = (100,100), (100,200),
which is simply the expected cost for a null system. With (200, 100), (200,200). Let an order processing system
larger values of a and for a given value of £, t becomes aggregate the information by reporting the total demand.
smaller and the system approaches the null system faster. The set of distinct states of this IS is given by {0} = {200,
300,400}. Let the prior density on the states be uniform.
Discussion: The functional form of the conditional Also, let the system be noiseless with respect to {8}. With
probability is fairly general in that, as t increases, the the system, the expected cost is found to be $12,500 with
information on the state at time 0 becomes progressively a'l = a'z = 150. This is the (opportunity) cost of lower-
irrelevant in predicting the state at t. a is a measure of the than-adequate resolution, since the cost with a perfect
rate at which the relevance of the signal is lost. For system and just-adequate resolution is $0 in this example.
example, if the demand for a product is highly variable,
then the corresponding a has a small value, indicating that
the relevance of the information is lost quickly. This 532 Cost of Higher-Than-Adequate Resolution
proposition indicates that it is desirable that the actual
monitoring time be close to the P-R time. Unfortunately, If e has higher resolution than Sp then some additional
this may not always be feasible when long information effort is required upon the receipt of a signal in order to
processing times and time variant action sets are involved. find the corresponding state in the P-R set Sp. In this case,
In those cases, the monitoring may have to be done earlier the difference in cost is equal to the difference in the cost
to avoid a loss of timeliness of the signal. This concept is of additional information processing.
further discussed with an example in Section 7 on design
modifications.
5.53 Action Relevant Resolution
5.5 Resolution Adequacy For a wide variety of decision problems, the level of detail
required is coarser than the corresponding P-R levels. For
Definition 8: Let Sp denote the payoff-relevant set,of the example, consider a production system with two batch
states for a DM. Let e be the set of states considered as sizes: 50 and 80 units. Say demand can take four values,
distinct by an IS. The resolution of the IS is just adequate 30, 50, 80 and 100 units. The P-R partition of the demand
if 8 = Sp, lower or higher than adequate accordingly as e space has four corresponding elements. However, note
has lower or higher resolution than Sp. that the restricted optimal batch sizes are 50 units for any
one of the states 30 and 50 and 80 units for the states 80
and 100 (assuming that the unit shortage cost is equal to
5.5.1 Cost of Lower-Than-Adequate Resolution the unit excess cost). Therefore, for this restricted action
set, an IS that cannot distinguish between the states 30 and
Let {8} = e have lower resolution than the P-R set {sp}. 50, and between 80 and 100 results in the same expected
To determine the impacts of this resolution on the DM's cost as the one providing the P-R partition. We refer to
payoff, we calculate the conditional probability A (sply) the less detailed IS as having the action-relevant (A-R)
from A(@Iy), as resolution. This exposition is both interesting and impor-
tant because it shows the possibility of getting the same
,(sply) = 0Ijp(sple),(ely) where
payoff (or cost) with less detailed information for a class
of decision problems.
p(spi 8) = p(# Isp)p(sp) / f pce Isp)p(sp) and Definition 9: Let {ss} = Ss be the state space partition of
Sp €Sp
an IS. This IS is said to have action relevant resolution, if,
for every s., only one action is optimal for every state that
Vsp£Sp 38 £8 such that p(G Isp) = 1.
may be contained in s,.
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Proposition 5: Consider two IS, one with the A-R resolu- Next we turn to the subsystem level of the IS and study the
tion and the other with higher resolution. Let the systems design tradeoffs involved.
be noiseless with respect to their own state partitions. The
expected payoff (or cost) difference between the two IS is
zero.
6. INSIDE THE IS BLACK BOX
Proof: Referring to Figure 2, consider {s} and {8 } as
partitions with A-R and higher resolution respectively. Let 6.1 Subsystem Characteristics
z(a,G) be the cost function. Since the IS are noiseless with
respect to their set of distinct states, the expected cost with Conceptually, an IS may be represented as a collection of
a system that provides partition {9}i s given by the following subsystems: monitoring storing, processing
(transformation), retrieving and transmitting subsystems
(see Marschak 1971). These are the fundamental informa-
I min z(a,#)p(8) tion handling activities, one or more of which can be
Bfe a [0441 identified in every IS. For example, a simple database
management system consists of storing, processing and
retrieving subsystems.
I ,zcal,81)p(81) + I *4,82)P(,D + ···-
1€St  2€52 The monitoring subsystem samples states of the world.For example, machine loading, operator capacity and
maintenance routines may be monitored by the schedulingwhere a, is the optimal action corresponding to si. With subsystem of the MRP-based lS. The processing subsys-the A-R resolution, the expected cost is tem processes the monitoring data to create new informa-
tion (e.g., the generation of parts list from customer order
I min y information) and/or transforms the monitoring data into
s,€S a€A 8, s,z(a,ei)p(Oil©p(si) aggregate reports. The parts requirement subsystem of the
integrated MRP system is an example of the processing
subsystem. It takes as input order and forecasting informa-Note that p(#ilsi)p(si) is equal to p(s, 1 #i)p(Bi) and that
tion and generates (through processing) raw materialp(4 #i) = 1 for all Gicsi. Therefore, the two expected
requirements. The exact sequence of subsystems is not thecosts above are equal.
same for every IS.
Discussion: Once the A-R level of detail is reached, more
details are of no consequence to the decision context.
Each subsystem may be considered as an individual system
Therefore, any additional information is undesirable and described by certain attributes which are referred to
because of the extra cost of more detailed information and as subsystem characteristics. For example, like the entire
IS itself, the monitoring subsystem has accuracy, frequency,the processing load placed on the DM. resolution, etc., as its attributes. These attributes are in
turn determined by the design variables of the monitor.Proposition 6: For systems that are noiseless with respect
The general relationships between subsystem characteris-to their own state partitions, A-R partition is "weakly tics and signal attributes are discussed in the balance ofcoarser" (i.c., never finer) than P-R partition. this section.
Proof: Suppose not. Assuming that A-R partition is finer
than the P-R partition, let { # } and {si} (in Proposition 5) The accuracy of each subsystem may be represented by abe the A-R and P-R partitions respectively. Without loss
of generality, assume that the A-R element {si} consists of likelihood function relating the inputs and outputs of the
two P-R elements, 81, and 81. Let a* and a** be the - subsystem. For a serial architecture, let {s,} = Si denote
optimal actions for the states 01, and 82 respectively. From the input set of distinct states fur subsystem i,i = 1,2,...,n.
P-R considerations, we have z(a*,8 <j = z(a*,81) and Note that {s,} is also the output set of stage i-1 for
i = 2,3,...,n. Let A(4+1 J sl) denote the probability of the
output state being sii+E, given that si is the input. If a
subsystem is noiseless and does not induce a change inFrom A-R considerations, z(a*,eli) < z(a**,eli) and
resolution, then A(. 1.) denotes an identity transformation.z(a**,822) < z(a*,82). This leads to a contradiction.
For example, an ideal transmission subsystem should have
Discussion: Since more detailed information is generally this property.
more costly, Proposition 6 indicates that for a class of
decision problems, the A-R resolution is less detailed than The signals of the IS are generated by the last subsystem,
the P-R resolution and is therefore cheaper to obtain. n. Combining the transitional probabilities for each
subsystem, the conditional probability of the signal beingPropositions 5 and 6 provide direct guidelines for selecting
y, given that the input of subsystem 1 is sl, is obtained asthe information content in IS design.
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7. SETTING DESIGN VARIABLES: "DOMINANCE
A(Y IsO = f ...  A(ylsn)A(s»]sn-))...ACS21si)
ANALYSIS"
S2€S2 Sn€ S.
What should be the IS design variable values, given a
However, the DM is generally interested in the output set particular decision setting? Consider an existing IS with
 Sk of the processing subsystem, k. Therefore, the certain signal attributes. Is the current design optimal? If
relevant likelihood function is X(4+ 1 | y), and is given by not, how should the design parameters (such as processing
capacity and number of error detection mechanisms, etc.)
be modified? We use a structured technique (we call it
"dominance analysis") to address this problem. The basic
principle is to narrow down the design parameter space by
. sifst A(4+list)[A(ylst)p(st) /  si<sl A(ylsi)p(si)]
successively eliminating signal attributes, subsystem
characteristics and design variables that do not cause a
substantial improvement in payoff. The three level
hierarchy allows us to deal with a few variables at a time,
For example, st may denote demand for each item, while as we move to lower levels of increasing details. There is
Sk+1 may denote total demand for a subset of items. Thus, some risk of suboptimization in this approach, but the
the accuracies of the individual subsystems can be related tradeoffs between computational simplicity and efficiency
to the overall likelihood function for the IS. become evident. Several variations of "dominance analysis"
are possible. One such technique is outlined below.
The signal resolution of the IS is bounded by the subsys-
tem with the lowest resolution. For example, the moni.
toring subsystem may be sensitive to demand of each item 1, We start from the DM's side, since starting with the
on each day, while the processing subsystem may aggregate large number of IS design variables makes the analysis
this information into weekly demand data for a group of difficult. Consider the intrinsic attributes one at a time
items. and examine their effects on the DM's payoff as
outlined in Section 5. If the payoff remains constant
The timing of a signal from the IS is determined by the (e.g., this can happen with signal timing if the action
activity durations of the individual subsystems and queueing set is time invariant over the time period of interest)
times between activities. The signal reporting frequency or decreases (e.g., this can occur if the current signal
depends on the activity and queueing times and also on the resolution is the same as that of the A-R set of states)
frequency of the monitoring subsystem. The signal with changes of an attribute value, then eliminate it.
monitoring time is determined by the sampling time of the If the effect on payoff is "insignificant" for one or more
monitor. attributes, then eliminate the same.
2. Turn to the subsystem level. Vary the subsystem
characteristics one at a time and note their effects on
6.2 Relating Design Variables to Subsystem the signal attributes (as outlined in Section 6) that
Characteristics were not eliminated in step 1. The aim here is to
identify"bottlenecks" at the subsystem level.6 If certain
Since the subsystems are relatively independent of one subsystem characteristics are found to be insensitive in
another in terms of their subsystem characteristics, the terms of their effects upon the signal attributes, they
problem of relating design variables to signal attributes are eliminated.
reduces to finding relationships between characteristics of
each subsystem and its design variables. It is not possible 3. For each subsystem characteristic not eliminated in
to have one universal model for relating design variables step 2, identify the corresponding design variables. As
and subsystem characteristics in any IS. Rather, the in step 2, vary the design variables one at a time and
models have to be chosen depending on the IS type. For eliminate the "insensitive" ones. Sometimes a change
example, queueing models may be used to relate design in a design variable may necessitate a change in some
variables such as the number of processors, batch size and other design variable(s) for technological reasons. For
permissible queue length to the average waiting time in the example, an increase in the number of order proces-
order processing subsystem of the MRP-based IS, while sors in an integrated production control system may
regression may be appropriate in relating the number of have to be accompanied by an increase in the number
error detection mechanisms to the frequency of missing of terminals for entering order information. In this
information in the transmission subsystem. Economic case, the two design variables have to be considered
production theory may also be useful in establishing in tandem in the analysis of the existing system. Also,
linkages between design variables and subsystem character- a change in a design variable may affect several signal
istics (see Kriebel and Raviv 1980). Next, we discuss a attributes. For example, increasing the number of
structured technique for setting the design variables of an error detection stages changes both accuracy and
IS.
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signal timing. At the end of this step, we have a small time t, Thus, the sampling time of the monitoring subsys-
set of "sensitive" design variables. tem (which is a design variable for the monitor) is t. In
this case, t is also the monitoring time, defined earlier as
4. Let V = {v} be the set of sensitive variables found in a signal attribute: Let p be the processing time necessary
step 3. Let the signal attributes be denoted by SA = to generate an updated production schedule from the
{sa}. Let the DM's payoff function be P = monitoring data. Thus the revised production schedule is
P(sat,saf,···)· The functional form of P has been available at time t + p. Say a DM uses this information to
discussed in detail in Section 5. Since {v} is the set of decide on the amount of raw materials to order. Let the
sensitive design variables, we can also write P as maximum amount that can be ordered be time variant and
P(Vi,VD-4 through a mapping between {sa} and {v}. be denoted by
With the sensitive design variables and their impacts a < O.
on payoff identified, we turn next to the cost side of A(t), at
the analysis, assuming that the payoff and cost are
separable. Let T be the P-R monitoring time. If the actual sampling
time t 0 T, then t should be changed. However, note that
5. Generally, the cost of implementing and operating the changing t affects the signal timing in addition to thesystem with new design variable values is not known monitoring time itself. This is an example of a change in
in advance. What is known with certainty is the cost a single design variable causing a change in multiple signal
at the current operating point v( = (vi ,vk'".), where attributes. If t < T, then increasing t improves the payoffthe subscript c refers to the current levels. Instead of on one hand due to increased signal "relevance" and on the
assuming a known cost function for the entire design other hand possibly reduces the payoff due to the delayedspace, we only assume that the partial cost derivatives signal timing (which affects the amount that can be
(with respect to the sensitive design variables) are
known at vc. With this knowledge, a second order ordered). Without considering the cost side, the optimal
Taylor series expansion gives the approximate cost choice of sampling time is given by
C(va) at a new operating point vn = (vin,vzv -) in the
neighborhood of v . More formally, let Avi = Vin - Vic min
denote the change in the variable v,. min r f
t i.ly,y aE[OA(t+p)1 . s,fs· s,EsLet the operator
z(a,s'DP(Sfi 14)1(4 ly)p(Y)]
such that where t affects the action set [OA(t + p)] and the relevance
of the signal as encoded in p(s'; ls,J).
fc = E Av an. Another example of a design modification leading to a1 v
change in multiple signal attributes is the tradeoff between
accuracy and signal timing. When uncertainty reduces over
The approximate cost at vn is given by C(vn) = C(\0 time, earlier signals are less accurate than later ones. Thus
+ fC(Vc) + 42C(Vc)· The new operating point can be on one hand, the expected cost decreases with later signals
chosen by considering the region in the design space due to the increase in accuracy, while on the other, it can
where the increase in payoff starts to saturate and the increase due to a possible reduction in the action set. The
cost of the corresponding design change begins to rise relevant design issue is to synchronize the system to
sharply. generate a signal at a time such that the DM's cost is
minimized. The choice of signal timing with time varying
The above procedure simplifies the design modification likelihood function and action set is given by
process by eliminating relatively insensitive attributes,
subsystem characteristics and design variables before . r min f
analyzing the payoff related tradeoffs (steps 4 and 5). It min [J z(a,s)At(s ly)pE(y)]
thus helps narrow down the search space and increases the t ycy aE[OA(t)] ·|scs
accuracy of the payoff and cost estimates. At the same
time, however, optimality of the solution cannot be ensured
due to the fact that the intrinsic attributes and subsystem 8. CONCLUSIONS
characteristics are considered one at a time.
This paper has attempted to provide a consistent, theory-
The following examples show how a change in a design based analytical framework for the evaluation of alterna-
variable may affect multiple signal attributes. Say the tive IS designs and modification of existing system designs
loading of machines on the shop floor are sampled at to better match the characteristics of the decision setting.
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4. Marschak and Radner assume that the information
structures are noiseless with respect to their set of10. ENDNOTES distinct states.
1. More precisely, less detailed than Marschak's (1963) 5. The subsystem characteristics are intrinsic propertiespayoff relevant description of states. of the subsystems. For example, the accuracy of the
processing subsystem is independent of the accuracy2. The concept of payoff relevance was introduced by of the transmitting subsystem, although they mayMarschak (1963). Roughly speaking, it refers to the handle the same data set.
level of detail in the information that is sensitive to the
DM's payoff. In this paper, we generalize the concept 6. For example, oIl but one subsystems may be noiselessto include all attributes of information. and still the noisy subsystem may introduce significant
noise in the signals.3. For clarity, suppose we are sampling independent
observationsyl'.., yN, from a population whose proba- 7. For this simple case, the intermediate level of subsys-bility functionf(y; B) involves one parameter, B. The tem characteristics is not necessary.
joint probability function of the sample observations
("signals") is
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